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What does believing in repressed memory mean? In a recent paper in this journal, Brewin, Li, 
Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019; Study 3) argued that when people are asked to 
indicate their belief in repressed memory, they actually think of deliberate memory suppression 
rather than unconscious repressed memory. They further argued that in contrast to belief in 
unconscious repressed memory, belief in deliberate memory suppression is not scientifically 
controversial. In this commentary, we show that they are incorrect on both counts. Although 
Brewin and colleagues surveyed people to indicate their belief in deliberate memory suppression, 
they neglected to ask their participants whether they (also) believed in unconscious repressed 
memory. We asked people from the general population whether they believe that traumatic 
experiences can be unconsciously repressed for many years and then recovered. In two studies of 
the general population, we found high endorsement rates [Study 1 (N = 230: 59.2% (n = 45); 
Study 2 (N = 79): 67.1% (n = 53)] of the belief in unconscious repressed memory. These 
endorsement rates did not statistically differ from endorsement rates to statements on repressed 
memory and deliberate memory suppression. In contrast to what Brewin et al. argue, belief in 
unconscious repressed memory among lay people is alive and well.  Finally, we contend that 
Brewin et al. overstated the scientific evidence bearing on deliberate repression (suppression). 
 









Belief in Unconscious Repressed Memory Is Widespread:  
A Comment on Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019) 
  
If one asks ordinary people whether they believe in repressed memories, they will often 
reply “yes.” But what does such an answer really mean? Does it indicate that many or most 
people believe that memories of traumatic experiences can be unconsciously blocked from 
awareness for many years? Or does it mean that many or most people believe that memories of 
traumatic experiences can be deliberately suppressed for many years? This seemingly minor 
distinction is important because such beliefs can guide therapists or clients in their decision to 
pursue purportedly repressed memory of abuse that they did not previously even know existed.  
The Memory Wars and Beliefs in Repression 
The memory wars (Crews, 1995) revolved around a debate regarding the existence of 
repressed memories. According to some proponents, traumatic experiences such as sexual abuse 
can be so horrendous that people push the memory of that trauma out of consciousness, and 
consequently, the traumatic experience, although still available in storage, becomes inaccessible 
for retrieval (Freyd, 1994; Terr, 1994; Williams, 1994). Some skeptics, however, contended that 
traumatic experiences are typically well-remembered, although occasionally people do not think 
about those experiences for a long time and require reminders to retrieve those memories 
(Loftus, 1994; McNally, 2005). This phenomenon of deliberate thought suppression has been 
extensively researched and its dynamics (e.g., ironic effects; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000) have 
been documented in numerous studies. 
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The debate regarding the existence of repressed memory was particularly controversial in 
the 1990s, which bore witness to a surge of legal cases involving patients who had allegedly 
recovered memories of sexual abuse in psychotherapy (e.g., Loftus & Davis, 2006). Proponents 
frequently asserted that sufficient evidence exists for the existence of repressed memories (e.g., 
Brown, Schelflin, & Whitfield, 1999). In contrast, skeptics argued that traumatic experiences are 
generally well-remembered and that there is no solid evidence for the repression of rich 
autobiographical memories (Loftus, 1994; Loftus & Ketcham, 1996).  
Since the heyday of the memory wars, several research teams have asked the general 
public, clinicians, and professionals (e.g., police) about their beliefs concerning the existence of 
repressed memories. The consistent finding has been high endorsement rates for belief in 
repressed memories, ranging from 58% (n = 64; Dammeyer, Nightingale, & McCoy, 1997; 
clinical psychologists) to 94% (n = 47; Merckelbach & Wessel, 1998; laypersons) of individuals 
drawn from various populations and disciplines.  
In response, some researchers have argued that people’s affirmative answers to repressed 
memory items (e.g., “Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many years”) might actually 
reflect people’s belief in the deliberate suppression of memories (Brewin & Andrews, 2014), an 
assertion that has received some empirical support (e.g., Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). If so, 
people may actually not harbor strong beliefs in the controversial phenomenon of unconscious 
repressed memories, but merely believe in the concept of suppression, namely, the conscious 
pushing of aversive memories out of awareness.  
The Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019) Study 
In a recent article in this journal, Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019) 
examined this proposition empirically. In their third survey study, they provided participants 
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with a statement on memory repression taken from a previous study (i.e., “Traumatic experiences 
can be repressed for many years and then recovered;” Kassin & Barndollar, 1992) and created 
two alternative statements (i.e., “Traumatic experiences can never be forgotten,” “Traumatic 
experiences can be deliberately blocked for many years and then recovered”). They found that 
76% (n = 122) and 74% (n = 119) of their sample concurred with the original and the adapted 
statement on deliberate repression, respectively. The authors concluded that this finding suggests 
that participants’ response to the original statement “could be based on a belief in motivated 
forgetting, a relatively noncontroversial process” (p. 9).  
We disagree with this conclusion. In the current commentary, we will show that the 
design features of Brewin et al.’s (2019) study preclude strong conclusions about the belief in 
repressed memories. We support our argument with new data that remedies Brewin et al.’s 
design problems and that raises serious questions regarding their conclusions. Also, we will 
argue that the way Brewin and colleagues formulated their survey item on deliberate repression 
is inconsistent with the current state of science in this field.  
Conscious versus Unconscious Repression 
A serious shortcoming of Brewin et al.’s study (2019) is that they did not include a 
statement about unconscious repression. To correctly conclude that individuals’ beliefs 
concerning repression in fact reflected conscious repression, a comparison statement on 
unconscious repression should have been administered as well. Such a design would permit us to 
know whether people would endorse the statement on unconscious repression. In addition, 
Brewin et al. used a within-subjects design. Accordingly, answers to the different repression 
statements could have affected each other, a concern that Brewin et al. acknowledged. To 
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address this methodological shortcoming, we used a between-subjects design to collect new data 




 We tested people with at least a high school education using MTurk. Participants were 
compensated with $0.25. In Study 3 of Brewin et al. (2019), 80 university students were tested. 
To examine three variants of the repression question, our aim was to test 240 participants (three 
groups of n = 80 each). We collected data from N = 255 (mean age = 32.21, SD = 10.01, range: 
20-71, 100 females, background: high school: n = 39, Bachelor: n = 151, Master: n = 55, PhD: n 
= 1, Other: n = 9). The participants reported living in the United States (50.6%; n = 129), India 
(41.2%; n = 105), the United Kingdom (2.0%; n = 5), Canada (1.2%, n = 3), and several other 
countries (totaling 4.8%, n = 12; in Europe, Asia, South America), with one person (0.4%) not 
reporting their country. The collected sample size (N = 255) amounts to a high-powered study as 
a G*Power analysis with a power of 0.80, α = 0.05, and an expected medium effect size (w = 
0.30) showed that 133 participants were needed (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The 
study is part of a larger project on false beliefs and memories and was approved by the ethical 
committee of the Catholic University of Leuven (protocol number = G-2019 03 1598). 
Materials 
 Three different online surveys were constructed based on the Brewin et al.’s survey 
(Study 3) using Qualtrics. Apart from demographic questions and one attention check question (I 
am a Robot: true, false, I do not know), six memory belief statements were used, as in Brewin et 
al.’s survey (e.g., eyewitnesses have more difficulty remembering violent than nonviolent 
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events) plus a statement on repressed memories. The six memory belief statements were, 
however, not analyzed for the purpose of this study. The three survey conditions differed with 
respect to the statement about belief in repression. One survey used the original statement (i.e., 
“Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many years and then recovered”; Kassin & 
Barndollar, 1992), one used the statement on deliberate repression used by Brewin et al. 
(2019)(i.e., “Traumatic experiences can be deliberately blocked for many years and then 
recovered”), and one used a new statement focusing on unconscious repression (i.e., “Traumatic 
experiences can be unconsciously repressed out for many years and then recovered”). The 
response options were the same as in Brewin et al. (i.e., generally true, generally false, I don’t 
know).  
Design and Procedure 
 A between-subjects design with three conditions was used in this study (original 
statement: n = 82, deliberate repression statement: n = 87, unconscious repression statement: n = 
86). Using MTurk, people were asked to participate in a study on memory. People who 
participated were linked to one of the three surveys, which required approximately one-and-half 
minute on average to complete (M = 88.8 sec., SD = 47.7). 
Results and Discussion  
All data are available on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/jzuqe/. Twenty-five 
participants were excluded because they failed the attention check question. Thus, the analyses 
were conducted on the remaining N = 230. In line with Brewin et al., we also found that many 
individuals endorsed the statement that “Traumatic experiences can be deliberately blocked for 
many years and then recovered” (69.6%, n = 55). However, the most important finding was that 
59.2% (n = 45) of the participants endorsed the statement on unconscious repression (see also 
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Table 1). This finding runs counter to Brewin et al.’s (2019) proposition that belief in genuine 
(unconscious) repression is not widespread in the general population.  
 
Table 1. Frequency of Responses to the Different Repression Statements.  
 “Traumatic 
experiences can 
be repressed for 





blocked for many 
years and then 
recovered” 
“Traumatic 
experiences can be 
unconsciously 
repressed out for 
many years and 
then recovered” 
“Traumatic 
experiences can be 
unconsciously 
repressed for many 
years and then 
recovered”* 
Generally true 54 (72%) 55 (69.6%) 45 (59.2%) 53 (67.1%) 
Generally false 15 (20%) 12 (15.2%) 22 (28.9%) 18 (22.8%) 
I do not know 6 (8%) 12 (15.2%) 9 (11.8%) 8 (10.1%) 
*This statement was only used in the second study 
To analyze whether there was a relation between the answers and the three different 
repression statements, we conducted a Chi-square analysis. No statistically significant relation 
was found, c2(4) = 6.28, p = 0.18, Cramer’s V = 0.12. To examine whether this effect was more 
in line with the null or alternative hypothesis, we conducted a Bayesian Chi-square analysis 
using JASP (version 0.9). We found a Bayes Factor (BF01) of 37.96, indicating that the data 
were more in line with the null (no relationship) than the alternative hypothesis (relationship 
between different statements and answers on those questions).  
Study 2 
In retrospect, one potential limitation with the new unconscious repression statement was 
that its wording might have been imprecise. That is, in the new statement (“Traumatic 
experiences can be unconsciously repressed out for many years and then recovered”), the word 
“out” might have been confusing for some participants. To rule out this possibility, we conducted 
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a second study and collected an additional group of participants (using MTurk) that received the 
same survey including a newly worded statement (i.e., “Traumatic experiences can be 




Eighty-two people completed the survey, of which 79 responses were valid (57% males 
(n = 45), 43% females (n = 34); mean age = 33.18, SD = 10.8, ranging from 20 to 65).  
Materials 
 The same Qualtrics survey was used as in Study 1 but now, the unconscious repression 
statement was reworded (i.e., “Traumatic experiences can be unconsciously repressed for many 
years and then recovered”).  
Procedure 
 We used MTurk to collect data in the same way as in Study 1.  
Results and Discussion 
We found that 67.1% (n = 53) of the participants endorsed this newly worded statement 
(see Table 1). Again, no statistically significant relation was found between the answers to this 
newly worded statement and the answers to the statements from the previous study, c2(6) = 6.47, 
p = 0.37, Cramer’s V = 0.10. 
The current findings negate the interpretation by Brewin and colleagues that endorsement 
of the original memory repression statement was based on a belief in conscious repression. If this 
were the case, one would expect a lower endorsement rate for the unconscious repression 
statement. Although numerically this was the case, the difference in endorsement was neither 
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substantial nor statistically significant. More important, approximately 60 to approximately 70 
percent of community individuals endorsed the statement that Brewin et al. omitted. Hence, 
contrary to Brewin et al.’s conclusions, many people still believe in the myth1 of unconscious 
repression.  
Deliberate Repression 
 Apart from the design problems of Brewin et al.’s study, these researchers argued that 
deliberate repression is a “noncontroversial process” (p. 9). The authors cited work on motivated 
forgetting (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Paradigms mentioned in that cited work and that have 
often been claimed to measure motivated forgetting were the Think/No Think and directed 
forgetting paradigm. In the Think/No Think paradigm (Anderson & Green, 2001), participants 
encounter several unrelated word pairs (e.g., ordeal-roach). After witnessing these stimuli, 
participants are presented with cue words (e.g., ordeal) and are asked to either recall the 
associated word (think) or not (no think). When participants are later asked to recall all response 
words during the presentation of cue words, no think response words are remembered less often 
than think response words. Moreover, a meta-analysis demonstrated that No Think words were 
associated with lower recall rates than words that were studied but not queried during the 
think/no think phase (8% reduction; Anderson & Huddleston, 2012). In the directed forgetting 
paradigm, participants are instructed to forget specific word lists or words. The general finding is 
that participants are less likely to remember these lists or words than others that are not 
instructed to-be-forgotten (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014).  
                                                
1 Following Brewin et al., we use the word “myth” when referring to the idea of unconscious 
repression. In doing so, however, we acknowledge that some scholars would dispute the 
contention that it is a scientific misconception. 
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We agree that work using the Think/No Think or directed forgetting paradigm can be 
construed as evidence that deliberate blocking of memories can sometimes make a memory 
harder to retrieve. However, we disagree with Brewin et al. (2019) that their survey statement on 
this issue is related to paradigms such as Think/No Think or directed forgetting paradigm. The 
statement that Brewin et al. used (“Traumatic experiences can be deliberately blocked for many 
years and then recovered”) focused on the assertion that traumatic experiences can be 
consciously suppressed for many years. However, work on the Think/No Think or directed 
forgetting paradigm has not addressed or demonstrated that entire experiences can be blocked for 
many years (Otgaar et al., 2019). Rather, this work focuses mainly on the blocking of simple 
stimuli, such as words, for a short period, which is a far stretch from blocking entire, richly 
detailed autobiographical experiences for many years. Furthermore, the work of Wegner and co-
workers (e.g., Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000) suggests that the deliberate suppression of emotional 
memories may backfire, i.e., may produce hyperaccessibility of suppressed thoughts, a pattern 
that is difficult to reconcile with the idea that people may block autobiographical memories for 
years from consciousness. We argue that Brewin et al. have overstated the scientific evidence 
bearing on deliberate repression (suppression), which they present in an unclear way: momentary 
deliberate suppression of thoughts does exist as the extensive work of Wegner and associates 
show, but that it may render emotional memories inaccessible for years is not backed up by 
empirical evidence.  
Concluding Remarks 
It is important to examine whether certain myths about memory (e.g., memory works as a 
video camera) are widely believed, as some authors (e.g., Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & 
Beyerstein, 2009; Simons & Chabris, 2011) have contended. Brewin et al. (2019) make the 
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useful observation that certain memory myths may not be as widespread as what was initially 
thought, or at least may be more nuanced than some have assumed. However, we have shown 
that this conclusion does not apply to the myth regarding repressed memory. We have 
demonstrated that many or most people continue to believe in controversial topics such as 
unconscious and even conscious repression (suppression). The fact that laypeople hold such 
pervasive beliefs in unconscious memory repression raises legitimate concerns for both clinical 
practice and legal proceedings in which central “evidence” is based on allegations from the 
“recovery” of so-called repressed memories. For example, embracing such incorrect beliefs 
might lead clinicians to suggestively seek and elicit repressed memories in patients potentially 
contributing to (false) recovered memories (McNally, 2012). It is because of these widely held 
naïve beliefs, ones that do not accord with scientific evidence about memory, that it is still 
important to seek testimony from memory experts in cases involving “recovered” memories 
(e.g., see Howe, Knott, & Conway, 2018). 
Our findings suggest that the belief in the scientifically controversial phenomenon of 
repressed memory remains widespread among the general public. Why is that the case? 
Baxendale (2004) provides at least part of the answer: Numerous films from all around the world 
have provided fictional examples of unconsciously repressed memories and how they can be 
fully recovered. These examples, after all, make for emotionally compelling and perhaps 
ironically, highly memorable, stories. According to Baxendale, the stereotypical and universal 
memory myths in these movies both misinform and reflect public opinion. Indeed, in Hollywood 
movies, television shows, and popular novels, fictional and dramatic depictions of unconscious 
repression abound (Dieguez & Annoni, 2013). Instead of merely asking whether people believe 
in repressed memories, we argue that it will be important to examine whether and how belief in 
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unconscious repressed memory is related to exposure to repressed memories in movies, 
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